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SYMPOSIUM:
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: EXCERPTS FROM KEYNOTE
ADDRESS
NOAH FELDMAN
The symposium topic, as you know, is Religion and Morality in
the Public Square, which as I count gives us three concepts:
religion, morality, and the public square. There are of course
three different methodological approaches and they are just little
ones: philosophy, history and law. So I am going to try to touch
on all six of these things and their interrelationships, but I think
if you multiply permutations of these you get numbers so great
that it will not be a success if I try to use all three of these
approaches to address all three of these concepts. I will take the
lawyer's prerogative and use the methodology that is essentially
a bad mix of philosophy, history and law and wait for the experts
in all of the substantive areas to correct me.
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I will begin with the idea of a public square. What is this idea
of the public square here, for us, in this context? I think it
alludes to several ideas that are closely connected to the notion of
participatory democratic governance. I want to suggest to you
that the problem of religion and morality is distinctively inflected
by the fact that we are in a participatory democracy, or what we
would like to be a participatory democracy. To hear a little bit of
historical context can, I think, help clarify why this is so.
In Europe in the modern era, the state emerged as a powerful
and effective form of governance. A basic settlement was reached
in two treaties, Augsberg and Westphalia, according to which the
religion of a state would be determined by the religion of the
sovereign of that state. It is a long and complex story as to how
this was reached-it was not necessarily the way the relationship
between religion and state had existed in the pre-modern era.
But in the modern era this became a kind of standard solution to
the problem-each prince or to each locale, its own religion.
Now, when the founders of the American Republic embraced
the ideal of popular sovereignty, and specifically the version of
popular sovereignty that no longer said that there was a monarch
who was sovereign, the idea that the state should follow the
religion of the sovereign immediately became a problem. I would
say prior to that there were debates and disputes over what
religion the sovereign should follow, and sometimes over who the
sovereign should be. There is a long history of British
constitutional dispute about what happens if the sovereign
becomes a new sovereign, whose religion is different, but the idea
of religion and state emerges, I think, just at that moment when
the sovereign becomes popular.
Why? Because the popular sovereign, that is to say, we the
people, do not belong to a single religion. So, what you might call
the modern solution to the problem of church and state, namely
religion of the state following the religion of the sovereign,
immediately becomes unworkable, unless it were to be the case
that every element of the popular sovereign, that is to say every
citizen, belongs to the same religion, an eventuality which could
happen in some places in some times, but certainly was never the
case in the United States. Even though at the time of the
American Revolution roughly 97% of the American population
was Protestant, one of the features of Protestantism then and
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subsequently, is that the members of the Protestant American
community did not think of themselves as belonging to exactly
the same religion. They were well aware of the diversity among
themselves, and had fought hard over it in recent memory, and
so needed to come up with what they thought might be a solution
to this problem, the problem again of the sovereign belonging to
many religions.
Our founding fathers thought that by taking religion out of the
federal sphere, by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion, and
simultaneously prohibiting the federal government from
establishing a religion, they had solved this problem once and for
all. As we know, they were wrong. Otherwise, some of us around
here would be out of business, so we should probably be grateful
for that fact. Much of the history of church-state relations in the
United States-at the state level, between the drafting of the
Constitution and the end of the second World War, and at the
federal level over the last 50 or 60 years-is the history of the
unfolding of the failure to solve permanently the relationship
between religion and government through this model of free
exercise and non-establishment.
Now why was the founders' solution incomplete? I am going to
oversimplify in trying to answer that question. I want to propose
a two part answer. The first part has to do with the public
square, and the second part has to do with religion and morality.
The reason I think the solution failed with respect to the public
square, is that the ideal of the public square-that is to say, some
sort of an ideal of participatory, discursive, democratic actions-
itself never lays out or defines the boundaries for discourse. It
does not include within itself the idea that certain topics are
permissible and certain topics are not. To see why this is so, you
might think of our free speech doctrine and think of the words
"public square" and their magic meaning in our free speech
doctrine.
In the public square there are meant to be almost no
limitations, and with respect to content, no limitation on the
content of free speech. The reason for that is not that we have
some affirmative theory of how great it is for all sorts of discourse
to be in the public square, we sometimes hear about marketplace
of ideas, but I do not think that is what is doing the work. What
is doing the work is that we have no good answers to the question
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of which speech should be prohibited in the public square. We do
not have an account of what are the right kinds of limitations-I
mean substantive limitations-that could possibly be put upon
free speech in the public square. So the doors are thrown wide
open.
Now, the wide-openness of those doors to discourse is at odds
with the ideal of participatory democratic politics conceived in
one way rather than another. Let me explain what I mean.
There are, broadly speaking, and this is an over-simplification,
two different visions of participatory democracy. One is what is
sometimes called the republican conception, according to which
the purpose of discourse in the democracy is to reach common
agreement on a policy to be pursued.
Now republicanism includes more than that. It often also
includes the idea that it is through the virtue of the participant's
discussion, and through their listening respectfully and carefully
to each other's arguments, that this sort of consensus will be
reached. But the element that I am most interested in is the
suggestion that in republican discourse our goal, the reason we
are talking to each other, is to agree at the end of the day.
The idealized image would be-and of course it never happens
this way-Athenians in their participatory democratic
institutions, or Roman senators in the glorious republican days of
Rome, discussing an idea or a policy and aiming to reach some
sort of agreement at the end of the day. That is the perception of
participatory democracy.
Another competing perception of participatory democracy is
sometimes called the pluralist conception. On that conception,
the reason we have electoral institutions and the reason we talk
within them, is not that we think that we are going to agree, but
that in a world of competing interests, competing ideals, and
competing values, we need some non-violent way of solving our
problems. If we thought we could not speak, we might come to
blows. Speech almost has the function of taking the lid off a
boiling pot of competing interests in society. In a liberal society,
speech is thought to be the most effective way of doing that.
Hence-our familiar adage-wrong speech or bad speech should




At the end of the day, in this pluralist model of participatory
democracy, the way we resolve things is not by agreeing, it is by
voting. The idea of voting here is that the reason we have to vote
is because we do not reach consensus. What makes a
participatory democracy great from our perspective is that at the
end of the day, we vote. The voting does not resolve our
differences with respect to changing our substantive views, it just
solves the problems by choosing one course of action that we all
agree we will participate in and follow, because the next day we
might win the debate. The next day we might change the
demographics and win the vote.
Notice that these two competing conceptions of participatory
democracy-the republican conception and the pluralist
conception-have utterly different views of what is supposed to
happen in the public square. According to one, the public square
is a place to convince each other of a common course of action
with our end goal being a common course of action that we agree
upon substantively. According to the pluralist model, the end
state goal is just for the thousand flowers to have bloomed, for us
not to use violence against each other, and more or less to decide
on a common course of action, not because we agree to it
collectively, but because somebody has voted and somebody has
won.
So, the public square itself is deeply contested with respect to
its purpose. The limitations that we might want to put on the
public square are further limited by the question of which of
these visions we would want to use. To a republican, there might
be perhaps some limits to what we can say in the public square
so that we know what the common form of discourse is that will
enable us to reach a common decision. To the pluralist, though,
it seems it would be a terrible mistake to allow limitations on
what is being said in the public square, because in any case we
are going to vote at the end of the day. There is more to be said
about these different visions of the public square, but I want to
put that aside now, and perhaps return to it a little later,
because I want to turn to the question of religion and morality.
The dual phrase religion and morality is itself fascinating in
the American context. Why do we say, as we always do, "religion
and morality" in the public square? What is the relationship
between religion and morality? Here again, I think it is fair to
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say that in American history there are two competing
conceptions of the proper relationship between religion and
morality.
The first view is a skeptical view of the relationship between
religion and morality that was characteristic of many of the
founding fathers. The view here is that the purpose of religion in
the world is to provide institutional support for the principles of
morality without which society cannot get along. A nice quote
that expressed this idea is George Washington's, sometimes
repeated in the modern era. Washington said: "Let us not lightly
entertain the supposition that morality may long be maintained
without religion." That is the view of somebody who thinks that
religion is not really the essence of morality (we will come to that
view in a moment), but rather that religion is a set of
institutional practices, cultural folkways, perhaps teachings for
the simple-minded-Washington might not have put it that
crudely, but it may well have been in his mind-without which
good morals cannot be maintained. And on the view of the right
relationship between religion and morality, morality is what
really matters.
A more theologically sophisticated version of this idea might be
seen, for example, in the writing of Horace Mann, the famous
educator and Unitarian who helped develop the modern
American idea of public education in Massachusetts in the early
part of the 19th century. To Mann as well, it was necessary to
teach morality in the public square because morality was
necessary for maintaining society. The way to teach morality, he
thought (in common with other 19th century Americans), was to
make sure that there was religion. But the religion he imagined
was not to be particularly substantive. It was meant to be
passages from the Bible, or rather a subset of passages from the
Gospels, that were thought to maintain good moral character.
Now this view, that the point of religion is to provide an
institutional support or buttress for substantive morality, was
not born in the United States. It has earlier Erastian roots and
indeed it can even be found in the classical sources. But it is an
idea that had tremendous weight and strength in much
American thinking about the right relationship between religion
and government, and again it depends on this idea that morality
[Vol. 22:2
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is what we are really after, and that religion serves the purpose
of morality.
Now let me contrast this with an almost exactly opposed view.
According to the opposed view, morality is simply a set of ideals
or values, the substance of which is dictated by the teachings of
religion. Now, I am oversimplifying that a bit as well because
many religious traditions-here at St. John's it is certainly
appropriate to mention the natural law tradition-do believe in
the existence of some principles of universal morality. These are
not precisely identical or not precisely derived from the contents
of revealed religion, but their content overlaps with the content
of revealed religion at least when everything is working well.
More importantly, religion is often, in this way of seeing things,
seen as the crucial source of moral values.
On this view, when people have moral values, it would be
almost meaningless for them to have those moral values without
there being some religious basis from which those morals
derived. This is extremely significant for people who believe, as
almost all Americans have believed for most of our history, that
morality ought to play some role in the decisions that I spoke of a
moment ago in the public square (I am going to discuss in just a
moment the view that morality should play no role in that
context, but let me say right away that that is a very unusual
view). Typically the view of most Americans has been that
morality plays some crucial role in our decisions regarding the
public square. Now if one thinks that morality is significant for
making public decisions, it matters a great deal whether one
thinks that morality is a thing which is the value in itself and
just subserved by religion, or whether alternatively one believes
that morality is just the result, the superstructural result, of the
core substructure that is religion itself.
Let me try. to illustrate this with a concrete example. If one
were to consider the question of same sex marriage, a profoundly
controversial issue in the United States today, and one in which
the issues of morality and religion are profoundly intertwined;
and one thought that the state ought to be in business of
governing marriage - it is possible to have an alternative view,
but most Americans seem to think we should not abolish family
law, and the state should have some role in determining
marriage; and if one furthermore thinks that marriage, however
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it is defined, will be connected to morality; then one must ask:
What are the kinds of arguments with respect to morality that
ought to count when we discuss what moral values should go into
our making the decision of what sorts of marriages should be
permitted or authorized by the state?
Now, if one believes that freestanding morality itself is the
most important element of this, and that religion just exists as a
sort of institutional support to assure that people have good
morals, then one might be perfectly happy to discuss this
question outside of contact with the substance of religious values.
One might think: What is morality? What does religion do?
Religion just gives us a sense that it is important to treat people
equally; that it is important to treat people as human beings.
But, the substantive teachings that religion may have with
respect to same sex relationships are not relevant to this public
discussion, because this public discussion is about morals. If on
the other hand, one has the view that what really matters is
religion, and that morality just reflects the substantive values
derived from religion, then it would be very strange indeed to
have a public debate and to make public decisions about
questions such as same sex marriage without invoking the
substantive values that religion provides on this subject.
This is a practical, concrete, deeply felt example of the two
alternative conceptions of how the relationship between religion
and morality ought to play itself out in a debate in the public
square. Now, just to complicate this already complex model one
last drop, and to bring the two parts of my comments so far
together, remember that I also talked about two different
conceptions of what should happen in the public square-a
republican conception and a pluralist conception. Now, here is
where I actually wish I had a blackboard. Imagine if you will a 2
x 2 matrix here. If one had a republican conception of what
ought to happen in the public square-that is, one that the point
of the debate over, for example, same sex marriage, was to reach
some agreement as a society about what is right, one could
nevertheless adopt either the view that religion is just a support
for morality or the view that religion is the substantive source of
morality. And one could use either of these arguments to argue
about same sex marriage. It is very abstract so again I am going
to make it very concrete. Imagine a debate between a secular,
[Vol. 22:2
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liberal egalitarian on the one hand, and a deeply committed
evangelical Christian on the other hand, on same sex marriage.
Let us assume that both the egalitarian liberal and the
evangelical have a republican ideal of what should happen in the
public square-that is they both think the reason for debate in
the public square is to come to an agreement about what is
correct. So, in this debate the egalitarian liberal will say, "It is
just true as a matter of substantive moral values that all human
beings are of equal worth and have a fundamental autonomy
right to choose whom they would like to form their lives with. So,
I am just right for the reason I have just given when I say that
the state must allow the authorization of same sex marriages in
the same way it allows and authorizes opposite sex marriages."
The other person, the evangelical Christian, says, "I agree with
you that the purpose of our discussion is to find the right answer,
I disagree with you about the right relationship between religion
and morality. I think that the morality of same sex marriage is
dictated by my substantive religious beliefs on the topic. For
those, I look to scripture, and I interpret scripture to prohibit
same sex relationships much less same sex marriage. I therefore
conclude, for the reasons that I have given, that we ought, as a
state, to settle upon a right answer to this question, my right
answer to this question."
This debate is entirely within the republican conception of
what happens in the public square, but we have got two different
views about the right relationship between religion and morality
expressed here. Note again that both of these participants think
morality is important. Neither is saying, and I think this is a
crucial point that is often missed-certainly by many liberals-
that religion alone ought to dictate results in the public square.
Almost nobody says that in American life-there are
Dominionists and others, but it is very rare. Both figures in my
hypothetical are saying that morality should control, but they
have different ideas about the relationship between religion and
morality. For the evangelical, the content of morality is
determined substantively by the content of his religion. He is
still arguing about morals, but the rules are derived from
religion. For the liberal in that context, it is also about morality,
but the substantive values of morality are not themselves derived
from religion. Now, that person does not think we should shut
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down religious education in America; quite the contrary, that
person may well attend a liberal Christian church and quite
possibly believe very deeply that religion teaches and ought to
teach something about substantive morality, indeed perhaps the
equality of persons and the permissibility of same sex marriage.
It is just that the egalitarian in my hypothetical example believes
that the point of religion is not to give you the content of
morality, but just to help you to validate and understand the
morality with which you began.
Now let us have the same two people participating in the
debate, but let us imagine that neither is a republican in the
sense that the point of our debate is to reach an agreement. Let
us imagine that they think the point of our debate is simply to
avoid violence in our society. They are pluralists. They think
would put it to a vote at the end of the day. They make the same
arguments, but they do not make the arguments with the
aspiration, the realistic aspiration, of convincing the other
person. The egalitarian says, "Look I am not so naive as to think
that I am going to convince you to abandon your interpretation of
scripture, at least not today. That will take many generations
and probably lots of television programs and other cultural
factors that might in the long run affect your religious beliefs."
The evangelical says, "No, my morality is derived from my
religion and my religion gives me specific teachings on these
questions." But then at the end of the day, each says, "We are
going to vote." That is participatory democratic politics.
Now, which of these two visions corresponds more closely to
the vision of what American life should look like? That is the
normative question. Which of these visions is a more appealing
vision of the way that American discourse in politics should look
like?
Now, let me say first from a historical perspective, neither of
these prevails. One cannot say definitely that American history,
if there is such a thing, definitely tells us that we have more of a
republican style of debate or more of a participatory pluralistic
style of debate. There are ups and downs, there are times when
one seems predominant, but at almost any point in American
history you can find, if you are careful and a good historian,
examples of people making those sorts of arguments for either
side-the "let us all reach a decision" and the "let us all vote."
[Vol. 22:2
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So, history is not going to resolve these questions for us
normatively speaking, and indeed it is not even clear that history
could resolve this problem for us historically speaking. I think
history here does excellent and crucial work in clarifying the
problem. I myself believe that this is a problem that you cannot
make heads or tails of without historical background, but history
is not going to tell you where to go on its own terms.
What can law do to resolve these problems normatively? Well,
law itself is hopelessly uncertain in America about whether it
wants to be the law of a republic or the law of a
participatory/pluralistic democracy. The most obvious example
of this debate is the question of judicial review. Judicial review,
in which certain substantive outcomes are removed from the
political process, can be seen as an instantiation of republican
ideology, because it can be seen as the notion that it will be up to
some appointed institutional body to get the right answers
derived from the Constitution for these questions. Legislative
action-which is, after all, where most of the action in law
happens most of the time-relies upon and depends upon some
notion of pluralistic politics, not because it may necessarily
believe in it. There may be state legislatures, or senators, or
congressmen in Washington who believe they are there to be
Roman senators. But at the end of the day you will notice they
always vote, they always use techniques of pure pluralist,
political decision-making, because that is just the way the system
empowers them to behave. The law itself is unclear about these
approaches.
Last but not least, there is philosophy, and let us take this in
the broadest sense of both moral philosophy and political
philosophy. Moral and political philosophy offer more hope for
providing normative solutions to these problems because from
within those realms one can make arguments about what would
be the right way to resolve and treat our system. There is
definitely the material there, and one does not need to go far to
meet political and moral philosophers, who will tell you not only
that there is a right answer to the question of how we ought to
decide substantive moral problems, but also that there is a right
answer as to how we can best organize our polity to get the right
answer.
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To get these substantive moral problems is appealing in
philosophy; in fact there is no consensus on these questions. So,
these philosophical questions themselves, precisely because they
are susceptible to multiple answers, defer the problem outside
the realm of philosophy back to the lawyers, back to the practical
institutional people out there in the world. Philosophers end up
providing material for these kinds of debates, but they do not end
the debate, they do not produce the bottom line answers that
people might like to see.
So, where does that leave us with respect to a contentious
problem like same sex marriage? It leaves us profoundly
unresolved. And to look at the emerging body of case law on
same sex marriage, is to see us as a people profoundly divided
along all of the different dimensions that I have mentioned: along
the dimension of two different conceptions of what we ought to be
doing in the public square, and along the dimensions of the right
relationship between religion and morality.
Look at the Massachusetts case on same sex marriage, the
Goodridge Case. In that case, the majority took the position that
there was no rational basis for state law to limit marriage to a
man and a woman. The dissenters provided a series of reasons
that they thought would qualify as a rational basis. The majority
went through each of them and rejected each one saying they
were not rational bases. What is most extraordinary about that
decision is what is absent. What is absent in Goodridge, and this
is really astonishing, is any recognition by the majority or by the
dissenters that the main reason for opposition in the state of
Massachusetts to same sex marriage is that there are people who
believe ultimately that the content of public morality ought to be
determined by the religious beliefs of the people who vote for that
public morality. Nobody talks about that. It is not proferred as a
reason.
It is not surprising that when you read this case, that when
students read this case, their reaction to this case is that it has
come out this way because these are not very good reasons that
they have been given. Marriage is for procreation, but what
about all those marriages that are not procreative. It looks like
an easy case, because it never addresses the actual rationale that
lay behind not only the initial definition of marriage, but the
subsequent political movements, not only in Massachusetts but
[Vol. 22:2
RELIGIONAND MORALITY
elsewhere, for preserving marriage as a relationship between two
people of opposite sexes. As we go to other states, this story is far
from over. We are only at the very early stages of this story. We
are seeing a patchwork quilt around the country of different
answers to these types of problems and questions, and in some
cases we are getting more of an overt recognition of the role of
religion here in this shaping of morality for many people, but we
are almost never getting it in the judicial context. We are almost
always getting it at the legislative level or the public
participatory democratic level.
I do not think that is a necessary connection, it does not have
to work that way for the reasons that I said a moment or two ago.
But it does lead us to the following question: What are we to
make of the system, a national system, where we think we have a
Constitution that ought to help us resolve questions like this,
where we want to live together in some sort or harmony, whether
it is a republican harmony or pluralist harmony, and where
nevertheless, we just do not have a single way of dealing with
these problems?
Now, one thing I have learned in working on constitutional
politics in Iraq is that people, both in the United States and
elsewhere, like to believe that they do have constitutional
solutions to problems. Yet, our constitution, on some of the most
crucial and basic questions-religion and politics being the most
obvious-is profoundly unresolved. Yet we manage somehow to
operate and get along. One objectively fair answer is to say that
we do not need to resolve these kinds of questions definitively,
provided that we operate within some sort of structure that
actually functions. But I have to tell you, that is too easy an out.
Nothing would be better than to end my remarks on that front. I
would be very happy to say, "You see, the bottom line is at least
nowadays we are not in the streets killing each other, and so our
system after all works pretty well, and we can pat ourselves on
the back, emphasize American exceptionalism, and be done with
it." It is just a profoundly dissatisfying answer to say that.
The reason it is dissatisfying is that at every juncture, but
especially in our history and especially at junctures like this one,
where the divisions on the questions I have been discussing are
profound and visible and intensely felt, there is a continuing risk
that we will fall into much deeper division as a society. I do not
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mean tomorrow we will start flogging each other in the streets.
But I do not think it is the kind of thing we can plausibly treat as
inconceivable. I think there are points in our history when we
have had violence along these grounds.
So, what I want to end with is not a congratulatory comment
on our ability to get along, but a kind of plea. The plea is for us
not to forget, that in order to preserve an order in which we
cannot decide even some of the most basic fundamental
questions, because we do not necessarily share a common set of
solutions to them, or even a framework for these solutions, we
have to be constantly aware of the need to work on these
problems. We cannot put them off to the side. We cannot
pretend that they will disappear. We cannot pretend that they
are solved. We cannot pretend that we do not have to deal with
them. I think that the point of a symposium like this one-and
the reason I am grateful for being asked to participate, and
excited for the rest of the day-is that these kinds of discussions
and conversations are crucially part of our work of holding
ourselves together as a nation. That is what we are doing here,
and I hope we manage to do it well.
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